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P. Vellaisamy
Department of Mathematics, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay,
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Abstract. Simpson’s paradox and collapsibility are two closely related concepts in the context of
data analysis. While the knowledge about the occurrence of Simpson’s paradox helps a statistician
to draw correct and meaningful conclusions, the concept of collapsibility deals with dimension-
reduction aspects, when Simpson’s paradox does not occur. We discuss in this paper in some detail
the nature and the genesis of Simpson’s paradox with respect to well-known examples and also
various concepts of collapsiblity. The main aim is to bring out the close connections between these
two phenomena, especially with regard to the analysis of contingency tables, regression models and
a certain measure of association or a dependence function. There is a vast literature on these topics
and so we focus only on certain aspects, recent developments and some important results in the
above-mentioned areas.
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1 Introduction
It is well known that statistics or more precisely statistical techniques play an important role in
addressing some of the problems of a society, an industry and a country. But, drawing intelligent
and correct decisions form the real-life data is not straightforward. Indeed, we read/hear different or
paradoxical conclusions in several contexts or situations. So, a layman gets confused and probably
believes in the famous quote “Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics,” in that order. In this paper, we
will address one of the well-known paradoxes due to Simpson. Simpson (1951) discussed how a
simple fact about fractions can lead to a contradictory conclusions in a wide variety of situations.
Though some statisticians (Yule (1903)) were aware of these issues in the beginning of 20th century,
it is Simpson who popularized this paradox, earning his name, through analysis of real-life data
that arise in several practical applications.
Simpson’s paradox occurs when an observed association between two random variables, say
X and Y , gets reversed after considering the third variable W , called a covariate or a background
variable. The situation of having two contradictory conclusions makes this phenomenon paradoxical.
It is one of the most discussed and studied paradoxes in the statistics literature. The knowledge
and the awareness of its occurrence is of importance for the statistical analysis of the data. It
arises naturally in several areas which include the analysis of contingency tables, regression models,
measures of association, survival analysis, etc. In this paper, we will discuss some examples of
Simpson’s paradox through some real-life data and then discuss some recent results in the areas
mentioned above. A closely related concept, namely collapsibility, is applied whenever the Simpson’s
paradox does not occur. We present a survey of some recent results, its relation to Simpson’s paradox
and discuss possible directions for future work.
2 Simpson’s Paradox
2.1 Real-life situations
We start with two examples discussed in the literature.
Example 1 (Graduate Admission Data in UC Berkeley). Let A ∈ {Y,N} denote the admission,
X ∈ {M,F} denote the sex and D ∈ {H,G} denote the department (H=History, G = Geography).
The following data roughly represents the graduate admission in the two departments H and G
(Bickel et. al (1975), discrimination suit against UCB ).
D
A X H G
Y
M 1 6
F 2 4
N
M 4 2
F 6 1
We observe
P (Y |M,H) =
1
5
<
2
8
= P (Y |F,H); (1)
P (Y |M,G) =
6
8
<
4
5
= P (Y |F,G). (2)
That is, departmentwise women applicants are favored and hence there is no bias against them.
But, considering the marginal table for A and X ,
X
M F
A
Y 7 6
N 6 7
2
we get
P (Y |M) =
7
13
>
6
13
= P (Y |F ), (3)
showing that overall men do better than women. The reversal of the inequality in (3), contrary to
the ones in (1)-(2), is called Simpson’s paradox.
Why does this paradox occur? To answer this question, we need to look for additional informa-
tion the data contains. First, look at the marginal table between A and D:
D
H G
A
Y 3 10
N 10 3
We have
P (Y |H) =
3
13
<
10
13
= P (Y |G),
showing that getting admission in history is tougher than in geography.
Next, look at the marginal table between X and D:
D
H G
X
M 5 8
F 8 5
It is clear that
P (H|M) =
5
13
<
8
13
= P (H|F ),
because more women applied to history department than in geography. Since the admission in
history is tougher than in geography, the reversal in (3) occurs.
A probabilistic justification due to Blyth (1972) is the following. Note that
P (Y |M) = P (Y |M,H)P (H|M) + P (Y |M,G)P (G|M) =
1
5
·
5
13
+
6
8
·
8
13
=
7
13
= ED|MP (Y |M,D)
P (Y |F ) = P (Y |F,H)P (H|F ) + P (Y |F,G)P (G|F ) =
2
8
·
8
13
+
4
5
·
5
13
=
6
13
= ED|FP (Y |F,D)
Because of 5
13
= P (H|M) < P (H|F ) = 8
13
, the reversal P (Y |M) > P (Y |F ) occurs . Observe that
the conditional distribution L(D|X) also plays a key role in Simpson’s paradox.
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Example 2 Consider the following data (Agresti, (1990)) concerning death penalty (D), race of
the accused (A) and race of the victim (V). Also, let W and B denote the white and the black,
respectively.
D
A V Y N
W
W 19 132
B 0 9
B
W 11 52
B 6 97
First look at the marginal table corresponding to A and D. Let AW or AB denote that accused
is a W or B (similar meaning for VW and VB).
D
Y N
A
W 19 141
B 17 149
From the above table,
P (Y |AW ) = 19/160 = 0.12 > 17/166 = 0.10 = P (Y |AB),
showing that the white accused are more likely to get death penalty. However, if we consider the
victim’s race also, we have from the first table that the association is reversed for both black and
white victims. For,
P (Y |AWVW ) = 19/151 = 0.126 < P (Y |ABVW ) = 11/63 = 0.175
Also,
P (Y |AWVB) = 0 < P (Y |ABVB) = 6/103 = 0.058.
Thus, Simpson’s paradox occurs.
2.2 Simpson’s paradox for events
Blyth (1972) first gave the probabilistic interpretation of Simpson’s paradox, in terms of conditional
probabilities. It may happen that for three events A, B and C,
P (A|B) < P (A|Bc), (4)
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while
P (A|BC) > P (A|BcC), P (A|BCc) > P (A|BcCc). (5)
As the inequalities in (5) are reversed, compared to (4), the Simpson’s paradox occurs.
Since P (A|B) and P (A|Bc) are the following weighted averages, namely,
P (A|B) = P (A|BC)P (C|B) + P (A|BCc)P (Cc|B), (6)
P (A|Bc) = P (A|BcC)P (C|Bc) + P (A|BcCc)P (Cc|Bc),
he pointed out that the reversal happens because the weights P (C|B) and P (Cc|B) for P (A|B) are
different than the weights P (C|Bc) and P (Cc|Bc) for P (A|Bc). Note if B and C are independent,
then the weights for P (A|B) and P (A|Bc) are equal and the inequalities of (5) will carry over to
P (A|B) and P (A|Bc) also. In other words, the Simpson’s paradox can not happen in this case.
Thus, Simpson’s paradox occurs because of the association between B and C.
Remark 1 Look at Example 2 again. The marginal table for the race of the victims (V) and the
race of the accused (A) is:
V
W B
A
W 151 9
B 63 103
From the above table, the conditional probabilities for the events V and A are:
P (VW |AW ) = 0.94; P (VW |AB) = 0.38
P (VB|AW ) = 0.06; P (VB|AB) = 0.62
showing that there is a strong (marginal) association between V and A and leading to Simpson’s
paradox.
Remark 2 It is well known that the genesis of Simpson’s paradox lies in a simple fact about
proportions. There exist positive integers such that
k
l
<
K
L
and
m
n
<
M
N
, but
k +m
l + n
>
K +M
L+N
.
For example,
1
6
<
2
9
and
5
7
<
3
4
, but
6
13
>
5
13
. This explains why Simpson’s paradox occurs in the
analysis of some contingency tables.
2.3 Marginal versus conditional association
For the analysis of contingency tables, Lindley and Novick (1981) argue that there is no statistical
criterion that would guard against drawing wrong conclusions or would indicate which table (con-
ditional or marginal) represents the correct answer. However, they suggested that if C is influenced
5
by B, then C should not be treated as a confounding variable. Pearl (1995) also suggested that
if C is affected by B, then marginal table, rather than the conditional ones, should be used for
inference. Thus, causal considerations must be used along with inference. However, there are other
researchers who argue Simpson’s paradox should not be viewed in terms of causality, as the reversal
is real and is not causal. Hence, the paradox is a statistical phenomenon that can be analyzed and
avoided using tools of statistical techniques.
One way to avoid Simpson’s would be to use a randomized experiment which is not always
feasible. Cornfield et al. (1959) proposed the minimum effect size criterion to explain an observed
association measure ρ(A,B) between A and B, if it is spurious. If B has no effect or less effect than
that of C on the likelihood of A, then we would expect
P (C|B)
P (C|Bc)
>
P (A|B)
P (A|Bc)
,
or the risk difference condition, namely,
P (A|C)− P (A|Cc) ≥ P (A|B)− P (A|Bc).
Schield (1999) suggested that this condition could be used as a simple method for deciding whether
C has the strength-the effect size necessary-to reverse the association ρ(A,B).
2.4 Simpson’s paradox as an association reversal phenomena
Samuels (1992) showed that Simpson’s paradox between events can be viewed as a particular case
of association reversal phenomena for random variables/distributions, which we describe now. Let
(Y,X,W ) ∼ F and for example FX(x) denote the marginal distribution of X . We say W is not
doubly linked to (Y,X) if at least one of the following condition holds:
(a) W ⊥ Y, (b) W ⊥ X, (c) W ⊥ Y |X, (d) W ⊥ X|Y.
Otherwise, it is doubly linked to (Y,X), i.e., W is linked to both Y and X . Henceforth, X ⊥ Y |W
denotes the conditional independence of X and Y , given W .
An association reversal can be defined for any relationR = R(Y,X) which denotes the directional
association between any two random variables X and Y . Henceforth, ↑ and ↓ means respectively
nondecreasing and nonincreasing. Some relations studied in the literature are:
R1: (stochastically increasing ) Y ↑ X if P (Y > y|X = x) is ↑ in x for all y .
R2: (mean incresing) Y ↑ X if E(Y |X = x) is ↑ in x .
R3: (positive quadratic dependence) Y ↑ X if F (y, x) ≥ FY (y)FX(x) for all (x, y)
R4: (covariance increasing) Y ↑ X if Cov(X, Y ) > 0 .
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The relations R3 and R4 are symmetric in Y and X . The above relations can also be defined for ↓
case also.
Samuels (1992) proved that the joint distribution F cannot exhibit association reversal with
respect to R3 if W is not doubly linked to (Y,X), that is, when one of the conditions (a) to (d) is
true. But, the above result is not true for the relation R4. For example, the condition W ⊥ X|Y
is not sufficient to prevent the association reversal for R4. However, W ⊥ Y prevents association
reversal for several R’s. See Samuels (1992) for some additional results in this direction.
2.5 Linear regression models
Let
E(Y |X,W ) = β0 + β1X + β2W (7)
with β1 ≤ 0. Also, let η = β2Cov(X,W ). Samuels (1992) showed that the distribution F exhibits
positive association reversal for R4 iff η > 0, and |η| > |β1|V ar(Y ). As a corollary, the association
reversal with respect to R2 holds.
Suppose the marginal model is also linear defined by
E(Y |X) = β˜0 + β˜1X,
where
β˜1 =
Cov(Y,X)
V ar(X)
.
Note from (7),
β1 =
Cov(Y,X|W )
V ar(X|W )
.
It is possible that β1 < 0 while β˜1 > 0, implying the occurrence of Simpson’s paradox for the
regression coefficients. Some sufficient conditions for the Simpson’s paradox have been recently
discussed in Chen, Bengtsson and Ho (2009).
2.6 Simpson’s paradox in survival analysis
In the context of the survival analysis, it is possible that increasing the value of a covariate X has
a positive effect on a failure time T , but this effect may be reversed when conditioning on another
possible covariate Y . When studying causal effects and influence of covariates on a failure time T ,
this aspect appears paradoxical and creates suspicion on the real effect of X . These situations may
be seen as a kind of Simpson’s paradox.
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Let X and Y be the covariates having effect on T . Simpson’s paradox occurs in survival proba-
bility at (t, s) if
(a) P (T > t + s|T > t,X = x, Y = y) ↓ in x, for all y and
(b) P (T > t + s|T > t,X = x) ↑ in x.
(8)
Scarsini and Spizzichino (1999) discussed the Simpson’s paradox for different notions of positive
dependence and aging.
Let h(t|x) denote the conditional hazard rate, given X = x, defined by
h(t|x) = lim
s↓0
P (t < T < t+ s|T > t;X = x).
Then, Simpson’s paradox for the hazard rate occurs if
h(t|x, y) ↑ in x, for all y, but h(t|x) ↓ in x. (9)
Di Serio, Rinott and Scarsini (2009) showed that Simpson’s paradox occurs naturally in the context
of survival analysis. They studied the range (t, s) for which (8) holds, and showed that under certain
conditions it holds for all t, s > 0. They discussed Simpson’s paradox for the linear transformation
model defined by
K(T ) = −βxX − βyY +W, (10)
where K is increasing and W ⊥ (X, Y ).
Suppose the covariates X and Y satisfy the model
Y = η(X) + V,
where η is ↑ and X ⊥ V . That is, (Y |X = x) has density
f(y|x) = fv(y − η(x)). (11)
Their main result is the following:
Theorem 1 Let T follow the model (10) and the conditional distribution L(Y |X) follow (11).
Assume V and W have increasing failure rates (IFRs). Then,
(i) Simpson’s paradox in survival probability defined in (8) occurs for all t, s > 0 if
βy < 0 < βx and βxx+ βyη(x) is decreasing in x. (12)
(ii) If W and V are both strictly IFRs, then Simpson’s paradox for hazard rate in (9) occurs for
all t, s > 0 if and only if (12) holds.
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For example, when (Y |X = x) ∼ N(µ+ ρx, 1− ρ2), then (9) holds ⇐⇒ βy < 0 < βx and ρ >
βx
|βy|
.
Note that the linear transformation model corresponds to the survival function
F T (t|x, y) = FW (K(t) + βxx+ βyy).
It can be seen that the Cox’s (1972) proportional hazard model
h(t|x, y) = h0(t)e
(βxx+βyy),
where h0(t) > 0, is a special case of linear transformation model with FW (t) = −e
t, t ǫ R. Also,
the proportional odds model (Pettitt (1984)) corresponds to the case FW (t) = 1/(1 + e
t), t ǫ R, the
logistic distribution.
It is interesting to note that even when covariates X and Y are independent, there exists the
choice of parameters in Cox model for which Simpson’s paradox in survival probability occurs
for some t, s > 0. See Di Serio et al. (2009) for more details. However, the association or the
dependence between X and Y , modeled through conditional distributions, is the main source of
Simpson’s paradox.
2.7 Simpson’s paradox for an association/dependence measure
Kendall’s τ and Spearman’s ρ are well known measures of concordance, a certain form of dependence.
For example, the dependence of Y on X is called stochastically increasing if P (Y > y | X = x)
is increasing in x for all y. In other words, when X is continuous and the partial derivative exists
(Cox and Wermuth (2003)), the conditional distribution function F (y|x) satisfies
∂F (y | x)
∂x
≤ 0, (13)
for all y and x, with strict inequality in a region of positive probability.
Let W be a covariate. Then,
∂F (y | x)
∂x
=
∫
∂F (y | x, w)
∂x
f(w | x) dw +
∫
F (y | x, w)
∂f(w | x)
∂x
dw. (14)
If W ⊥ X , then
∂f(w | x)
∂x
= 0 and hence (Cox (2003))
∂F (y | x)
∂x
=
∫
∂F (y | x, w)
∂x
f(w)dw,
showing that
∂F (y | x, w)
∂x
≤ 0 =⇒
∂F (y | x)
∂x
≤ 0, for all y, x and w.
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Thus, Y remains stochastically increasing in x after marginalization over the covariate W. Note in
general (see (14)) it is possible that
∂F (y | x, w)
∂x
≤ 0, for all (y, x, w), but
∂F (y | x)
∂x
> 0
for some y and x, implying Simpson’s paradox.
3 Collapsibility
Collapsibility is a concept closely related to that of Simpson’s paradox. Generally, whenever Simp-
son’s paradox does not occur, the collapsibility issue arises naturally as a dimension reduction
problem in the context of data analysis. It was originally associated with the analysis of contin-
gency tables and so we start with the same.
3.1 Collapsibility of contingency tables
Let X1, · · · , Xn be a set of n categorical variables, where Xj ∈ {1, · · · , mj}, 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Let
i = (i1, · · · , in) denote a cell of the n-dimensional table, and p(i) denote the cell probability with
p(i) > 0 and
∑
i
p(i) = 1.
Let n¯ = {1, 2, · · · , n}. Define l(n)(i) = l(n)(i1, · · · , in) = ln p(i1, · · · , in). Let A = (a1, · · · , ar), aj ∈
n¯, iA = (ia1 , · · · , iar), and |A| denotes the cardinality of A. Define, for any subset A ⊂ n¯,
l
(n)
A (iA) =
∑
ij :j∈Ac
l(i1, · · · , in); l˜
(n)
A (iA) =
1∏
j∈Ac
mj
lA(iA).
For the n-dimensional table, let
l(n)(i) =
∑
Z⊆n¯
τ
(n)
Z (iZ) (15)
be the log-linear model (LLM), where τ
(n)
Z (iZ) is the r-factor interaction parameter when |Z| = r.
Then, it can be seen that (Vellaisamy and Vijay (2007))
l˜
(n)
A (iA) =
∑
Z⊆A
τ
(n)
Z (iZ), ∀A ⊆ n¯. (16)
For example, when n=3,
l(3)(i1, i2, i3) = τ
(3)
123(i1, i2, i3) + τ
(3)
12 (i1, i2) + τ
(3)
13 (i1, i3) + τ
(3)
23 (i2, i3)
+τ
(3)
1 (i1) + τ
(3)
2 (i2) + τ
(3)
3 (i3) + τ
(3)
φ
=
∑
A
τ
(3)
A (iA),
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where A is any subset of {1, 2, 3}. Then
l˜
(3)
12 (i1, i2) :=
1
m3
∑
i3
l(3)(i1, i2, i3),
= τ
(3)
12 (i1, i2) + τ
(3)
1 (i1) + τ
(3)
2 (i2) + τ
(3)
φ
=
∑
Z⊆{1,2}
τ
(3)
Z (iZ).
Indeed, the interaction factor admits the following representation
τ
(n)
A (iA) =
∑
Z⊆A
(−1)|A−Z|l˜
(n)
Z (iZ), ∀A ⊆ n¯. (17)
Whittemore (1978) defined first τ
(n)
A (iA) as a straightforward extension and remarked later that
l(i) =
∑
Z⊆n¯
τZ(iZ). Recently, Vellaisamy and Vijay (2007) gave a direct proof of (17) by considering
l˜A as the function on the poset (P,⊆), and using Mo¨bius inversion theorem. Note also that, by
Mo¨bius inversion theorem, (16) holds iff (17) holds.
Let now for simplicity A = {1, · · · , r}, and B = {1, · · · , r, r + 1, · · · , s}, where r ≤ s < n.
Define pB(iB) =
∑
ij :j∈Bc
p(i), the cell probabilities of the marginal (condensed over Bc) table. Define,
similarly,
l(s)(i) = ln(pB(iB)) =
∑
Z⊆B
η
(s)
Z (iZ) (18)
be the LLM for the marginal table. Then as seen in the LLM for the full table,
l˜
(s)
Z (iZ) =
1∏
j∈B\Z
mj
∑
ij :j∈B\Z
l(s)(i) =
∑
A⊆Z
η
(s)
A (iA), (19)
for any Z ⊆ B. The following definition of collapsibility is due to Whittemore (1978).
Definition 1 An n-dimensional table is said to be collapsible into an s-dimensional table with
respect to τ
(n)
A , A ⊆ B, if (i) τ
(n)
A = η
(s)
A and strictly collapsible if, in addition to (i), (ii)τ
(n)
Z =
0, ∀ Z ⊇ A,Z ∩ Bc 6= φ holds.
Let
d(B)(iB) = l
(s)(i)− l˜
(n)
B (iB) (20)
and for any Z ⊆ B
d˜
(B)
Z (iZ) =
1∏
j∈B\Z
mj
∑
ij :j∈B\Z
d(B)(iB). (21)
The next result (Vellaisamy and Vijay (2007)) characterizes the conditions for collapsibility.
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Theorem 2 Let δZ = (η
(s)
Z − τ
(n)
Z ), for Z ⊆ B. An n-dimensional table is collapsible to an s-
dimensional table with respect to τnA if and only if
d˜
(B)
A (iA) =
∑
Z⊂A
δZ(iZ)⇐⇒
∑
Z⊆A
(−1)|A−Z|d˜
(B)
Z (iZ) = 0, (22)
where d˜
(B)
Z is defined in (21), and A ⊆ B.
We next mention an important result for the strict collapsibility for hierarchical log-linear models
(HLLM), a subclass of LLMs, defined as follows:
Definition 2 A LLM l(n)(i) =
∑
Z⊆n¯
τ
(n)
Z is said to be hierarchical if τ
(n)
B 6= 0 =⇒ τ
(n)
A 6= 0 for
A ⊂ B or equivalently τ
(n)
C = 0 =⇒ τ
(n)
D = 0 for D ⊃ C.
Let now n¯ = A + B + C. For a HLLM, Bishop, Fienberg and Holland (1975) (BFH (1975))
showed that the n-dimensional table is collapsible into a s-dimensional table (over C) with respect
to τ
(n)
A∪V , where V ⊆ B, iff τ
(n)
Z = 0, for all Z ∩A 6= φ and Z ∩B 6= φ, that is, XA ⊥ XC |XB. Later,
Whittemore (1978) showed that they are only sufficient but not necessary. Recently, Vellaisamy
and Vijay (2007) showed that those conditions are necessary and sufficient for strict collapsibility
with respect to a set of interaction parameters, which is stated below.
Theorem 3 Let n¯ = A + B + C be such that |A ∪ B| = s and |C| = n − s. Then, an n-
dimensional table is strictly collapsible (over C) into an s-dimensional table with respect to the set
CL = {τL|L ⊆ A ∪B;L ∩A 6= φ} if and only if XA ⊥ XC |XB.
It follows from the above result that for k ∈ {1, 2}, a 3-dimensional table is strictly collapsible
into a 2-dimensional table with respect to τ
(3)
k and τ
(3)
12 iff τ
(3)
123 = 0 and τ
(3)
k3 = 0. Note also that
when k=1, the conditions τ
(3)
123 = 0 and τ
(3)
13 = 0 are nothing but BHF’s (1975) sufficient conditions
for collapsibility with respect to τ
(3)
12 or τ
(3)
23 .
For some recent results on the collapsibility of full tables based on conditional tables/models,
one may refer to Vellaisamy and Vijay (2010). The concept of collapsibility for contingency tables
was later extended to the study of regression models by Wermuth (1989) and several others.
3.2 Collapsibility of regression coefficients
Let Y be a continuous response variable, X be a continuous influence variable and A be a discrete
(background) variable with levels i = 1, 2, · · · , I. Initially, the problems of collapsibility were
addressed only for parallel regression models (Wermuth (1989)) defined by
E(Y |X = x,A = i) = αyx(i) + βyxx, 1 ≤ i ≤ I, (23)
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where βyx =
σyx(i)
σxx(i)
=
Cov(Y,X|A = i)
V (X|A = i)
is the regression coefficient. Since σyx(i) = βyxσxx(i) for all
i, we have
σyx(A) = Cov(Y,X|A) = βyxV (X|A).
Let us now introduce the following notation:
µy(A) = E(Y |A), µx(A) = E(X|A), σxx(A) = V (X|A),
σyx = Cov(Y,X), σxx = V (X), P (A = i) = πi > 0.
In general, βyx(A) = (σyx(A)/σxx(A)) is a function of A. In the parallel regression model, βyx(A) =
βyx. Note also from the model (23), µy(A) = EX|A(αyx(A) + βyxX). The following definition of
collapsibility is due to Wermuth (1989).
Definition 3 The parallel regression coefficient βyx is said to be collapsible over A if βyx = β˜yx,
where β˜yx is the regression coefficient for the marginal linear model
E(Y |X = x) = α˜yx + β˜yxx. (24)
The above model implies σyx = β˜yxσxx. Next we present a necessary and sufficient condition for
collapsibility, due to Wermuth (1989) (see also Vellaisamy and Vijay (2008) for a simple probabilistic
proof).
Theorem 4 The regression coefficient βyx of the parallel regression model (23) is collapsible over
A if and only if CovA(αyx(A), µx(A)) = 0.
As a corollary, (i) αyx(A) or µx(A) is degenerate, or (ii) βyx = (µy(A)/µx(A)) a.e., with µx(A) 6=
0, is a sufficient condition for collapsibilty.
The next result, due to Vellaisamy and Vijay (2008), is more general, as it does not assume
(Y,X,A) follows a conditional Gaussian distribution, a condition usually assumed in the literature.
Theorem 5 The regression coefficient βyx of the model (23) is collapsible if
(i) Y ⊥ A|X or
(ii) X ⊥ A|Y and VA(µy(A))EA(σyy(A)) = VA(µx(A))EA(σxx(A)).
Remark 3 Note that if X ⊥ A|Y and Y ⊥ A, then A ⊥ (X, Y ) (Whittaker (1990)) and hence
condition (ii) of the above result is satisfied. Thus, βyx is collapsible.
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3.3 Random Coefficient Regression Models
The condition that Cov((Y,X)|A = i)/V (X|A = i) is independent of the levels of A is stronger and
may not hold in several real-life applications. For example, the well-known degradation models of
the form
yi(t) = α(i)− β(i)t, (25)
where yi(t) denotes the log-performance of specimen A = i as a function of age t, shows that
different specimens have different linear degradation. Such models arise in accelerated life-testing
problems (Nelson (2004), p. 530). The model (25) can be written in the form
E(Y |X = x,A = i) = αyx(i) + βyx(i)x,
or equivalently
E(Y |X,A) = αyx(A) + βyx(A)X, (26)
where βyx(A) = (σyx(A)/σxx(A)), is a random coefficient regression model. For these models,
Vellaisamy and Vijay (2008) introduced and studied average collapsibility which we discuss next.
Definition 4 The random regression coefficient βyx(A) is said to be average collapsible (A-collapsible)
if β˜yx = EA(βyx(A)), where β˜yx is the regression coefficient of the marginal linear model
E(Y |X = x) = α˜yx + β˜yxx. (27)
The following result generalizes Theorem 4.
Theorem 6 The random regression coefficient βyx(A) of the model (26) is A-collapsible if and only
if
EA(βyx(A))V (µx(A)) = Cov(βyx(A), σxx(A)) + Cov(µy(A), µx(A)). (28)
It is of practical interest to know the conditions under which both the random regression coef-
ficients are collapsible.
Theorem 7 Consider the random coefficients regression model (26) with P (X = 0) = 0. Then
α(A) and β(A) are both A-collapsible if one of the following conditions holds:
(i) E(α(A)|X) = α˜ a.e., (ii) E(Y |X,A) = E(Y |X) a.e.
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Next, we briefly discuss the collapsibility problems for the logistic regression coefficients. Let Y
be a binary response variable taking the values 0 and 1, X be a random vector of p risk factors and
A be a discrete background variable with levels i = 1, · · · , I. Guo and Geng (1995) obtained some
collapsibility results for the regression coefficients of the logistic regression model. We focus only
on random coefficient logistic regression model of Y on X, for the levels of A, defined by
ln{
P (Y = 1|X,A)
P (Y = 0|X,A)
} = α(A) + βT (A)X. (29)
We say that the logistic regression coefficient vectors β(A) is A-collapsible if EA(β(A)) = β˜, where
β˜ is the regression coefficient vector for the marginal regression model
ln{
P (Y = 1|X)
P (Y = 0|X)
} = α˜ + β˜TX.
Theorem 8 Let X be a continuous random vector. Then, for the model (29),
(i) A ⊥ Y |X implies α(A) and β(A) both are A-collapsible.
(ii) A ⊥ X|Y implies β(A) is A-collapsible.
For a proof, see Vellaisamy and Vijay (2008). Finally, we address the collapsibility issues for a
certain measure of dependence for two random variables.
3.4 Collapsibility of distribution dependence
Let F (y|x, w) denote the conditional distribution function, where Y is a response variable, X is an
explanatory variable (continuous) and W is a background variable. Then, the function
∂F (y|x, w)
∂x
,
when it exists, is called a distribution dependence function (Cox and Wermuth (2003)). It rep-
resents the stochastically increasing property between X and Y . When X is discrete, the partial
differentiation is replaced by differencing between adjacent levels of X . The following definition is
due to Ma, Xie and Geng (2006).
Definition 5 The distribution dependence function is said to be homogeneous with respect to W
if
∂F (y|x, w)
∂x
=
∂F (y|x, w′)
∂x
, for all y, x and w 6= w′ and collapsible over W if
∂F (y|x, w)
∂x
=
∂F (y|x)
∂x
, for all y, x and w.
Ma et al. (2006) showed that the distribution dependence function is uniformly collapsible and
hence collapsible iff either (a) Y ⊥ X|W ; or (b) X ⊥ W and
∂F (y|x, w)
∂x
is homogeneous in w. Cox
and Wermuth (2003) showed that either condition (a) or (b) is sufficient to ensure that no effect
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reversal or Simpson’s paradox occurs. Note that homogeneity is a stronger condition which may not
hold for most of the models that are encountered in practice. For example, consider a simple linear
regression model defined by Y = m(X,W ) + ǫ, where m(x, w) = α1x+ α3xw, and ǫ ∼ N(0, 1). Let
φ be the standard normal density. Then,
∂F (y|x, w)
∂x
= −(α1 + α3w)φ(y −m(x, w)),
and hence is not homogeneous over W . For such models, the concept of average collapsibility
introduced and studied by Vellaisamy (2011) is a very useful concept. Indeed, when the distribution
dependence function is homogeneous, it reduces to collapsibiltiy. We say that the distribution
dependence function
∂F (y|x, w)
∂x
is average collapsible over W if
EW |X=x
(
∂F (y|x,W )
∂x
)
=
∂F (y|x)
∂x
, for all y and x.
Vellaisamy (2011) showed that average collapsibility holds if (i) Y ⊥ W | X or (ii) W ⊥ X
holds. These conditions are also necessary when W is a binary variable. An example, where
average collapsibility holds, follows next. Let φ(z) and Φ(z) respectively denote the density and
the distribution of Z ∼ N(0, 1).
Example 3 Consider the linear regression model
Y = α1X + α2W + α3XW + ǫ,
where ǫ ⊥ (X,W ) and ǫ ∼ N(0, σ2). Then
(Y |x, w) ∼ N(m(x, w), σ2),
where m(x, w) = α1x+ α2w + α3xw. Hence,
∂F (y|x, w)
∂x
= (
−1
σ
)(α1 + α3w)φ(
y −m(x, w)
σ
),
which is not homogeneous.
Suppose W ∼ N(0, 1) and W ⊥ X . Then (Y |x) ∼ N(α1x, v
2(x, σ)), where v2(x, σ) = (α2 +
α3x)
2 + σ2. Then, it can be shown that (see Vellaisamy (2011))
EW |X=x
(
∂F (y|x,W )
∂x
)
=
∂F (y|x)
∂x
,
so that average collapsibility over W holds.
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Note also from (14) that average collapsibility holds if and only if
∫
F (y | x, w)
∂f(w | x)
∂x
dw = 0 for all (y, x). (30)
The conditions (i) and (ii) of average collapsibility are not necessary, unless W is binary. A
counter-example follows:
Example 4 Let (Y |x, w) ∼ U(0, (x2 + (w − x)2)−1) so that
F (y|x, w) = y(x2 + (w − x)2), 0 < y < (x2 + (w − x)2)−1.
Assume also (W |X = x) ∼ N(x, 1) so that
∂
∂x
f(w|x) = −φ′(w − x) = (w − x)φ(w − x).
Then it can be seen that (see Vellaisamy (2011))
∫
F (y|x, w)
∂
∂x
f(w|x)dw = 0, for all (y, x).
Thus, from (30), average collapsibility over W holds, but neither condition (i) nor condition (ii) is
satisfied.
Conclusions. The examples and the applications discussed in this paper clearly demonstrate
that Simpson’s paradox is a crucial aspect in the data analysis and the issue of collapsibility should
be looked into only after ascertaining the nonoccurrence of Simpson’s paradox. Only recently, the
issue of Simpson’s paradox for survival analysis and for certain measures of association has been
addressed. However, the conditions of collapsibility for survival models, when the co-variate is
either known or unknown, are yet to be explored. Specifically, the concept of average collapsibility
(Vellaisamy (2011)) is more relevant in view of the nature of the Simpson’s paradox in survival
models (Di Serio et. al (2009)). These and other considerations are of practical interest and some
of these issues are already under consideration. The findings will be reported elsewhere.
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